By Aditi Bhojnagarwala.
Aditi Bhojnagarwala is a Research Scholar at the Milon K. Banerji Arbitration Centre.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule, has provided much-needed clarity on a procedural tug-of-war that has long divided various High Courts across the country. The central issue addressed by the Court was whether the power to extend the mandate of an arbitral tribunal under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“A&C Act”), rests with the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, or the Referral Court (the High Court or Supreme Court) that originally appointed the arbitrator. By delivering a definitive interpretation of the term ‘Court’ within the scheme of the Act, the Supreme Court has reinforced the statutory boundaries between the appointment of arbitrators and the ongoing supervision of arbitral proceedings.
The dispute in this case originated from a Memorandum of Family Settlement (MFS) dated 11 January 2021, executed between members of the Chowgule family. Arbitration was invoked in May 2021 following further disagreements. The procedural history became complex when the presiding arbitrator resigned, leading the parties to approach the High Court of Bombay at Goa for the appointment of a substitute arbitrator under Section 11(6) A&C Act.
Simultaneously, an application for the extension of the arbitral mandate under Section 29A was filed before the Commercial Court. The Commercial Court allowed the application, extending the time for the tribunal to make its award. This order was immediately challenged by Respondent No. 1 via a writ petition, asserting that the Commercial Court lacked jurisdiction because the arbitrator had been appointed by the High Court.
The Single Judge of the High Court referred the matter to a Division Bench, which concluded that if a High Court constitutes a tribunal under Section 11, then any Section 29A application must lie before that High Court. Following this reasoning, the Single Judge quashed the Commercial Court’s extension order. The appellant then moved to the Supreme Court, contending that the Commercial Court is the only appropriate forum under the statutory definition provided in Section 2(1)(e) of A&C Act.
The Court held that applications under Section 29A must lie before the “Court” as defined under Section 2(1)(e) of the Act, i.e. the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction (or the High Court exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction, where applicable). The fact that the arbitrator was appointed by the High Court under Section 11 does not alter this position. Their reasoning was grounded in three main pillars: the statutory definition of “Court,” the scope of a Referral Court’s jurisdiction, and the rejection of hierarchical perceptions in favour of the rule of law.
The Court strongly reaffirmed the principle that a defined term must carry its statutory meaning unless the context clearly requires otherwise. Section 2(1)(e) exhaustively defines “Court” for the purposes of Part I of the Act.
The Court rejected the argument that “context” justified deviation merely because a Civil Court might substitute an arbitrator appointed by a High Court. Such reasoning, the Court held, is based on perceived judicial hierarchy rather than statutory command, and is antithetical to the rule of law.
Relying on Chief Engineer (NH) v. BSC & C JV, the Court held that curial supervision under provisions like Sections 14 and 29A must lie with the court defined under Section 2(1)(e).
The Court emphasised that Section 11 jurisdiction is special, limited, and exhausted upon appointment of the arbitral tribunal. Relying on SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. and subsequent jurisprudence, the Court reiterated that the role of the High Court or Supreme Court under Section 11 is confined to a prima facie examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement.
Once the arbitrator is appointed, the appointing court becomes functus officio, retaining no supervisory or continuing control over arbitral proceedings. Any assumption that the appointing court “watches over” the arbitration was firmly rejected as legally unsound.
The Court decisively rejected concerns about “jurisdictional anomaly” or “conflict of power” between High Courts and Civil Courts. Drawing from A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, it reaffirmed that jurisdiction flows solely from law, not from status, hierarchy, or institutional prestige. A Civil Court exercising powers under Section 29A does so not as an inferior authority reviewing the High Court, but as a statutory forum entrusted with a specific function by Parliament.
The Supreme Court thus set aside the judgments of the Division Bench and the Single Judge, restoring the jurisdiction of the Commercial Court to decide the Section 29A application.
This judgment is a major doctrinal clarification in Indian arbitration law. By resolving conflicting High Court decisions, it restores predictability and procedural certainty, both essential for arbitration to function as an efficient alternative to litigation.
The judgment resists the temptation to recentralize arbitration around constitutional courts. Section 11 is treated as a gateway function, not a supervisory one, aligning Indian law with international arbitral best practices. Additionally, the Court’s insistence on adhering to Section 2(1)(e) reflects disciplined statutory interpretation. Allowing “context” to be shaped by judicial discomfort with hierarchy would have opened the floodgates to ad hoc jurisdictional reasoning.
Furthermore, Section 29A was introduced to combat delay. Channeling every extension application to High Courts merely because they appointed the arbitrator would defeat this legislative purpose and overburden constitutional courts.
The judgment is significant not merely for resolving this conflict, but also for its reaffirmation of foundational principles of arbitral autonomy, statutory interpretation, and the limited nature of judicial intervention in arbitration. By rejecting a hierarchy-based and “contextual” deviation from the statutory definition of “Court”, the Supreme Court reinforces the Act’s structural coherence and reiterates that jurisdiction flows from statute, not judicial status.
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